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Abstract: The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety mailed an essay written by Richard 
Retting and Sergey Kyrychenko (IIHS, 2005) to many universities and individuals where 
they accused my coauthor and me of being Junk Scientists.  This has become a typical 
pattern for the IIHS, attacking every study that fails to find a benefit of Red Light 
Cameras, but never criticizing work that supports their beliefs.  In this paper I defend my 
work against their claims, and pose the question:  Who are the real junk scientists?  
 
 
 
 
February, 2005 
 
 
The first two pages serve as a brief response to the false allegations by the IIHS (via 
Richard Retting and Sergey Kyrychenko).  Details and documentation for each statement 
follow this brief introduction.  
Brief Response 
 
It is surprising that an institution such as the IIHS resorts to name-calling when a project reports 
data that go against their deeply-held beliefs.  If there are valid limitations of our work, we made 
every effort to point them out in the report.  We welcome any additional valid criticism and 
suggestions. However, Retting and Kyrychenko (R&K)’s comments admit to one of only two 
explanations: 1) They are purposefully distorting our methods, or 2) They did not read and 
understand the methods and careful robustness checks that were done.  They bring up three main 
objections to our work: 
 
1) “…Burkey and Obeng treated data from intersections with and without cameras as if the 
cameras had been randomly assigned to their locations. In fact Greensboro officials installed 
cameras at intersections with higher crash rates…” Status Report 2005 
 
FALSE.  It is impossible for our report to give this impression.  We dealt with this issue at 
length, and modeled it in two specific ways.  First, we included many variables that account for 
these differences in crash rates.  Second, in order to make sure that we had accounted for any 
additional unobserved heterogeneity, we ran a Fixed Effects model.  This method tracks each 
intersection individually, allowing the Red Light Camera (RLC) variable to pick up only the 
effect of the RLC placement relative to the accident rate at these same intersections (see last 
page of the report).  The model R&K use with contrived data is in no way related to our 
methods, and the data does not reflect the data in the tables in our report. Their suggestion of a 
RLCGROUP variable is unacceptable, and is demonstrated to give incorrect results in this 
document.  Additionally, Greensboro officials installed cameras at both high and low accident 
locations.  Many high accident locations did not receive RLCs.  We discuss the non-random, 
non-experimental nature of our data at length in the report, and discuss its shortcomings. 
 
2) “Publicity and media coverage generally make drivers aware that a city is using red light cameras, 
not specifically which intersections have cameras. … By ignoring the spillover effect, the authors could 
obtain only a biased (low) estimate of red light camera effectiveness.”  R&K 2004 
 
FALSE.  NCGS § 160A-300.1b: Any traffic control photographic system installed on a street or 
highway must be identified by appropriate advance warning signs conspicuously posted not 
more than 300 feet from the location of the traffic control photographic system.  In other words, 
drivers in North Carolina know exactly where the cameras are located.  Additionally, we did not 
ignore the possibility of spillover effects, and discussed this in the report.  The spillover effect is 
well-known, but far from well-documented.  Indeed, the primary effects of RLCs are still not 
well-understood.  The IIHS often cite two of Retting’s studies as evidence of a spillover effect, 
which looked at 5 intersections for 24 hours to look for spillovers. We geocoded Greensboro’s 
intersections preparing to explicitly test for spillover effects using spatial correlation over time.  
If spillover effects exist, they should be stronger at intersections closest to the RLC sites since 
they are clearly marked.  However, when many different (and appropriate) modeling techniques 
failed to show a benefit, measuring the spillover effects of the nonexistent benefits appeared to 
be a moot exercise.  However, we tested for spillover effects several ways, and found nothing.  
 
3) Additionally, they state that our conclusions were not reviewed by peers.  They say that the 
purpose of peer review is to provide a “seal of competence” and that it tells us “These findings 
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are worth paying attention to.”  The purpose of peer review is not to review conclusions, but 
methods and clarity.   Science is not about whether or not one is happy with the answer; rather, it 
is about trying to discern whether or not the investigator is honestly and intelligently searching 
for the truth.  Of course, peer review is not a guarantee of this, but should be encouraged. 
 
Our work has not been peer reviewed simply because enough time has not elapsed since 
finishing the initial report.  In my profession we generally issue reports, get important feedback 
and comments, present our work at conferences, and then submit our work for formal “peer 
review” and publication.  The process of peer review through publication can take many years, 
and lack of peer review is not a valid criticism of anyone’s recent work.  Our methods are now 
being peer reviewed.  Attempts by the IIHS staff to subvert this process are unprofessional. 
 
In our study, the accident rates at intersections without RLCs went down much more than those 
with RLCs, continuing a long-term decreasing trend in accidents in Greensboro, NC.  We 
address how this cannot reasonably be attributed to spillover effects in our report.  We believe 
that we reasonably concluded, “At a minimum, we can say that there is no evidence that the RLC 
program is decreasing accidents.  Additionally, the data shows that the sites with RLCs are not 
benefiting from the overall [long-term] decreasing trend in accidents in Greensboro.” (p. 48) 
 
From looking at the data, the question should not simply be whether RLCs work, but when they 
may work and when they may not.  From Table 4.1 in the report, simple before/after 
comparisons of accident rates at the 18 RLC sites in Greensboro show anywhere from a 36% 
decrease in accidents at one intersection, to a 57% increase in accidents at another.  We need to 
design careful studies to examine whether these differences are random, or if some intersections 
can really benefit from RLCs.  The IIHS wants you to believe that RLCs are always appropriate 
and will always reduce accidents at all intersections, including those without RLCs.  If you 
question this conclusion the IIHS will label your work “incompetent junk science”.  Real 
scientists who are objectively looking for the truth do not behave in this way.    
 
There are flaws in all studies on the efficacy of RLCs, including ours. But the ones invented by 
Retting and Kyrychenko are simply not true. We continue to call for more careful studies of 
RLCs, because most scientists are simply not convinced either way.  If we truly care about 
reducing accidents, we will continue to plan and execute more careful studies.  Until we truly 
understand what will happen when a RLC is placed, we should be cautious about using them. 
 
Please read the details that follow if you want additional documentation of each of the statements 
above. Consult researchers who do not have an agenda.  Read any of the good comprehensive 
reviews of RLC literature by McFadden and McGee (1999), Maccubbin, Staples, and Salwin 
(2001), McGee and Eccles (2003), or Milazzo, Hummer, and Prothe (2001).  Come to your own 
conclusions.  Demand convincing evidence from people who demean those who disagree with 
them, and from anyone who wants to convince you that there is a clear and simple answer. 
 
Mark L. Burkey, Ph.D. 
Assistant Professor 
Department of Economics and Transportation/Logistics 
North Carolina A&T State University 
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Supporting Details1 
 
Let me first apologize for the length of what follows, but the response to these unsubstantiated 
claims must be as clear as possible.  I will try to make this response as clear as possible for both 
the scientific community and the body of public officials and engineers.  I will try to avoid as 
much jargon as possible, but technical details are necessary.  I will refer the reader to additional 
reading material in such cases.  My goal here is neither to convince you that my study is perfect 
nor to demonize Retting and Kyrychenko (R&K).  However, it is important to realize the lengths 
they have gone to in an attempt to unfairly censure the hard, competent work we did. 
 
I will now rebut the points made by Retting and Kyrychenko about the report, and then delve 
into some other details.  Please take Burkey and Obeng (2004) for what it is—a competent, 
honest look at the data, albeit with many real-world limitations on the data that are fully 
disclosed in the report. 
 
 
I. Just Look at the Data! 
 
First, let us look at the data.  Even if one disagrees over methods, the numbers should convince 
you that the impact of RLCs is not clear.  Making simplistic tables is difficult for this data 
because the RLCs in Greensboro were phased in between the 27th and 36th month of our 57-
month study Jan. 1999-Sept. 2003.  First, let me reproduce Table 4.1 from our study, which 
focuses only on the 18 intersections where RLCs were placed. 
 
The crash rates are “normalized” to a rate per 10 months to make comparisons a little easier.  For 
example, at site #01, the camera was placed toward the end of the 26th month of the study 
(February, 2001).  So we observe 26 months of data before the installation, and then 31 months 
after the installation.  For this one intersection, there were 61 accidents reported in the first 26 
months and 72 during the remaining 31 months.  This is a monthly rate of 2.346 accidents per 
month before and 2.323 after installation.  We then multiply these numbers by 10 to get an 
accident rate per 10 months.  In total for these 18 intersections there were 841 accidents observed 
before RLC placement and 778 after; 527 intersection-months before and 499 after gives the 
overall 2.5% decrease in the rate we saw at these intersections.2  If Red Light Cameras are 
having a beneficial effect on accident rates, it is very small.  Additionally, if more of the RLCs 
were placed at high accident locations, then the regression to the mean effect should cause some 
of these intersections to experience a reduction in accident rates naturally.  However, this is not 
generally borne out by the data. 
 
 
                                                 
1 In this document I use the words “I”, and “my study” on occasion.  The purpose is not to belittle the valuable 
contributions of Dr. Obeng and the student assistants on this project.  Rather, as the principal investigator “I” am 
giving my personal response to the claims of the IIHS. 
2 Let me alert everyone that in double checking my numbers for this table, I discovered that I incorrectly divided the 
after RLC numbers by the (number of months observed - 2) due to misplaced parentheses in a formula.  This 
unfairly inflated the “after” figures in this table.  However, the “total” figures were correct, and the wide variation in 
results is still apparent.  The corrected table appears in this document. 
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Table 4.1 : Before/After Statistics for 18 RLC Sites 
RLC Sites: No RLC  Normalized/10 months RLC Sites: With RLC Normalized/10 months 
ID # FTL AINJ BINJ CINJ PDO Total FTL AINJ BINJ CINJ PDO Total %Chg 
01 -- -- 2.31 10.00 11.15 23.46 -- 0.32 1.61 8.71 12.58 23.23 -1.0% 
02 -- 0.38 1.92 9.62 6.54 18.46 -- -- 0.32 8.71 8.39 17.42 -5.6% 
03 -- -- 2.69 1.92 7.31 11.92 0.32 -- 1.61 2.58 6.77 11.29 -5.3% 
04 -- 0.38 1.15 4.23 10.00 15.77 -- 0.32 1.29 8.71 9.35 19.68 24.8% 
05 -- -- 3.21 5.36 6.79 15.36 -- 0.34 0.34 7.93 15.52 24.14 57.2% 
06 -- -- 1.85 7.41 7.41 17.04 -- 0.33 0.33 7.67 8.67 17.00 -0.2% 
07 -- 0.37 1.11 6.30 1.85 9.63 -- -- 1.00 4.67 2.33 8.00 -16.9%
08 -- -- 0.36 6.79 10.36 17.50 -- -- 1.72 3.79 6.90 12.41 -29.1%
09 -- -- 0.33 4.33 9.33 14.00 -- -- -- 1.48 9.26 10.74 -23.3%
10 -- -- -- 1.03 1.03 2.07 -- -- -- 0.36 1.07 1.43 -31.0%
11 -- -- 2.07 6.55 12.07 20.69 -- -- 2.14 5.36 6.43 14.29 -31.0%
12 -- -- 0.67 5.33 6.33 12.33 -- -- 1.11 3.70 7.04 11.85 -3.9% 
13 -- 0.32 0.65 4.52 6.13 11.61 -- -- 0.77 4.62 9.23 14.62 25.9% 
14 -- -- 0.86 9.71 20.29 30.86 -- -- -- 5.45 17.27 22.73 -26.3%
15 -- 0.30 1.52 4.24 5.76 11.82 -- -- 0.42 2.92 4.17 7.50 -36.5%
16 -- -- 1.52 3.64 5.76 10.91 -- 0.42 0.42 3.33 6.25 10.42 -4.5% 
17 -- -- 2.50 5.31 10.63 18.44 -- -- 0.40 12.80 14.40 27.60 49.7% 
18 -- 0.32 1.61 7.74 13.87 23.55 -- -- 1.15 13.85 11.92 26.92 14.3% 
Total -- 0.11 1.44 5.78 8.63 15.99 0.02 0.10 0.84 5.95 8.66 15.59 -2.5% 
 
It is not possible to simply compare the experience at these 18 intersections with the overall 
trends experienced in the rest of the city because the cameras were installed over the course of 9 
months (27th-35th month of the data).  However, to get a sense of what was happening at 
intersections without RLCs, we can divide the data into two roughly equal periods: 
 
Table 4.2: 18 RLC Sites Before and After the RLC Program: Common Types of Accidents 
  First 29 months of Data Last 28 months of data 
CRASH_TYPE FTL AINJ BINJ CINJ PDO Total FTL AINJ BINJ CINJ PDO Total 
REAR END, SLOW OR STOP -- 1 17 152 188 358 -- 1 6 172 201 380 
ANGLE -- 2 34 78 115 229 -- 2 15 82 124 223 
LEFT TURN, SAME ROADWAY -- 1 7 29 44 81 -- -- 5 16 26 47 
SIDESWIPE, SAME DIRECTION -- -- 2 4 37 43 -- -- -- 10 37 47 
LEFT TURN, DIFFERENT ROADWAYS -- -- 6 13 15 34 -- -- 2 1 3 6 
REAR END, TURN -- -- -- 5 10 15 -- -- 1 1 11 13 
TOTAL (including omitted categories) -- 6 78 302 454 840 1 5 40 299 432 777 
Table 4.3: 285 Control Sites Not Chosen for RLC Installation 
  First 29 months of Data Last 28 months of data 
CRASH TYPE FTL AINJ BINJ CINJ PDO Total FTL AINJ BINJ CINJ PDO Total 
REAR END, SLOW OR STOP -- 2 41 600 728 1371 -- 2 42 570 663 1277 
ANGLE 4 22 178 581 857 1642 4 12 168 609 832 1625 
LEFT TURN, SAME ROADWAY 2 9 69 231 338 649 -- 5 37 117 175 334 
SIDESWIPE, SAME DIRECTION -- -- 8 33 211 252 -- -- 4 30 235 269 
LEFT TURN, DIFFERENT ROADWAYS 1 2 19 76 131 229 -- -- 9 38 67 114 
REAR END, TURN -- -- 1 22 35 58 -- -- 5 18 23 46 
TOTAL (including omitted categories) 10 46 406 1705 2660 4827 8 27 339 1538 2299 4211 
 
Looking at the RLC intersections in table 4.1 we see a 2.5% decrease overall.  For comparison, 
looking at the totals in tables 4.2 and 4.3 we see roughly a 7.5% decrease at the RLC sites and a 
12.8% decrease at the non-RLC sites during the same time period.  Could the 12.8% decrease be 
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caused by spillover effects?  Not likely, but this was discussed at length and tested for in many 
different ways in the original report. 
 
Looking at tables 4.2 and 4.3 we see no real decrease in angle accidents (229 to 223), but see a 
moderate increase in rear-end accidents (358 to 380).   During the same time period, the non-
RLC intersections saw a decrease in rear-end accidents, and a much smaller decrease in angle 
accidents.  Looking again at Table 4.1, we see some intersections that had large improvements in 
accident rates, and some with large increases.  Apparently, Red Light Cameras have the potential 
to cause great harm as well as have great benefits as recently discussed in Persaud et al. (2004).  
My next (and last) project regarding Red Light Cameras will be to explore any systematic 
differences between the intersections that see a benefit, and those that experienced an increase in 
accidents.  Let me give you a little insight into this now.  The main variable that seems to 
account for these differences is traffic volume.  The following graph illustrates this: 
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One can see a fairly clear pattern here, with a trend line displayed for reference.  The more traffic 
volume on the road, the more likely RLC placement will be associated with an increase in 
accidents.  Two clear outliers to the trend, labeled with black dots, appear to have high volumes 
but saw a decrease in accidents after RLC placement.  What could account for this?  It turns out 
that these two intersections are “T” intersections.3   
 
This is the type of information that the die-hard proponents of RLCs should be providing.  Of 
course, the information presented above doesn’t constitute “proof” of anything, but represents 
good evidence suggesting that we need more serious study on this issue.  This is particularly true 
given the tendency to locate RLCs at high volume intersections.  
                                                 
3 Although one of them also involves a driveway into a hardware store. 
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II. Flaw #1, Ignoring that intersections are neither created nor chosen equally 
 
“…Burkey and Obeng treated data from intersections with and without cameras as if the 
cameras had been randomly assigned to their locations. In fact Greensboro officials installed 
cameras at intersections with higher crash rates…” Status Report 2005 
 
R&K do not mention that this accusation should actually cause us to find a much larger 
improvement at the RLC sites due to “regression to the mean bias”4.  However, many high and 
low accident locations were chosen for RLC placement.  Many high accident locations were not 
chosen for placement.  The table below illustrates this.  Out of the 35 intersections with the 
highest number of crashes in the first 24 months or our data (the RLC program began in 27th 
month), 11 of the 18 RLCs were placed at them.  Out of the top 15 high accident locations, five 
were eventually chosen for RLC placement.  Still, we did not treat the RLC locations as 
randomly selected, as this would obviously be improper. 
 
Intersection Rank, First 24 Months of Data 
Rank 
Order 
Accident 
Count 
RLC 
SITE?
Rank 
Order 
Accident 
Count 
RLC 
SITE? 
1 78 Y 19 40 Y 
2 62 N 20 39 Y 
3 59 Y 21 38 Y 
4 54 N 22 37 N 
5 54 Y 23 35 N 
6 51 Y 24 35 N 
7 51 N 25 35 N 
8 49 N 26 34 N 
9 47 N 27 33 N 
10 47 N 28 32 N 
11 46 N 29 32 N 
12 46 N 30 32 N 
13 45 N 31 31 N 
14 44 N 32 31 N 
15 43 Y 33 30 N 
16 43 Y 34 30 N 
17 42 Y 35 30 N 
18 41 Y       
 
We took several measures to control for differences between the 303 intersections in the study, 
including controlling for any differences that we might not be able to measure, called 
“unobserved heterogeneity”.   As an economist, the type of statistical techniques I use, called 
“econometrics”, are designed for controlling for differences in individual subjects, even 
unobserved differences.  We realize that real world data is non-experimental.  These issues are 
discussed at length in the report.  We repeatedly cautioned readers not to literally interpret the 
results because of the non-experimental nature of the data, and because no one knows the 
“perfect” model to use to explain accidents.   
                                                 
4 For example, see Persaud et al. (2004) for a discussion. 
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We worked with local officials to carefully measure the characteristics of the 303 intersections in 
our report.  We focused on collecting data on those characteristics that would help explain 
accident rates regardless of whether a RLC is present.  We used amber timing, all red clearance 
intervals, speed limits, traffic volume, number of traffic lanes, signage, and many others.  
Properly including these factors in the analysis do not allow the intersections to be treated as 
identical.  The result is that, unless an unknown, important variable was omitted: 
 
Only the part of the relationship between RLCs and accident rates that cannot be accounted 
for by all of the other explanatory variables will be attributed to the RLCs.   
 
We then took the most conservative approach to ensure that our results were not due to omitted 
variables.  We ran many other models that would pick up any problems due to differences 
between intersections that our explanatory data could not account for (i.e. unobserved 
heterogeneity).  The most complete way do this with panel data is to run a fixed effects model.5   
Basically, this model considers each intersection as an individual, marking each with a dummy 
(categorical) variable.   
 
R&K showed ingenuity by making up some data and an oversimplified linear model to “prove” 
how incompetent our analysis was.  A lesson I carefully teach in my statistics classes is that one 
can always find a model that will seemingly “prove” anything you want.  However, such a model 
will not stand up to a “smell test” by a competent econometrician.  Let us analyze the imaginary 
data that R&K created with proper techniques (like those used in our report), which are NOT the 
techniques they suggest.   
 
Table 2 from R&K(2004) from Imaginary City 
 Acc.  Acc.  Acc. Acc. 
Month Int. A Camera A Int. B Camera B Int. C Int. D 
1 50 N 48 N 20 22 
2 56 N 53 N 18 24 
3 46 N 44 N 19 21 
4 50 N 44 N 20 20 
5 43 N 47 N 19 17 
6 42 N 46 N 18 17 
7 44 N 30 Y 18 16 
8 43 N 29 Y 20 17 
9 28 Y 27 Y 17 20 
10 26 Y 27 Y 18 16 
11 28 Y 25 Y 19 15 
12 27 Y 26 Y 18 19 
 
                                                 
5 We also ran the closely related “random effects model”. See any good econometrics book, e.g. Econometric 
Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, Wooldridge, 2002.  See the last page of Burkey and Obeng (2004) where 
we discuss some of the additional models we ran to verify our results. 
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I rearranged the table a bit to make it clearer for discussion.  There are four intersections, A 
through D.  RLCs are placed at A in month 9 and B in month 7.  R&K correctly show that if they 
run an incorrect model, they get meaningless results.  If you try to “explain” the accident rate 
using only the month and whether a RLC is present, the fact that RLCs are placed at high 
accident locations will make it appear that RLCs are causing the increased accidents.  This is 
because of a high simple correlation between accident rates and the RLC variable. 
 
Would anyone seriously attempt to use such a model?  Certainly not anyone trained in linear 
models.  It is hard to believe that R&K actually think that this is the model we presented.   If we 
run the incorrect model they claim that we used (on the REAL data from Greensboro, NC-- 
however running a Poisson model rather than linear) we get the following coefficients: 
Model R&K Claim We Used, Greensboro Data 
Variable Coefficient Std.Err. b/St.Er. p value 
Constant -0.37265853 2.30E-02 -16.211 0 
MONTH -5.39E-03 7.15E-04 -7.541 0 
RLC 1.05048833 4.51E-02 23.287 0 
 
Indeed, this model does give incorrect results, picking up the fact that the RLC intersections have 
higher accident counts, “collapsing two effects” as R&K suggest.  This makes the coefficient on 
RLC 1.05 rather than the 0.349 estimated in Burkey and Obeng (2004) for total crashes.  The 
coefficient of 1.05 in a Poisson model would indicate an enormous difference between the 
number of accidents at RLC intersections and non-RLC intersections.6     
 
In Burkey and Obeng (2004) we felt that there was a chance that we were not truly capturing all 
of the reasons why some intersections have higher accident rates than others by including our 
explanatory variables.  In order to make sure, we ran the (Poisson or negative binomial) fixed 
effects model described earlier.  In its simplest form, such a regression model includes a variable 
that keeps track of each intersection individually.  In Imaginary City, for these four intersections 
we need three such variables, which will represent the difference in accident counts between the 
four.  One of the intersections will serve as the reference category (say, intersection D), and the 
three variables will represent the difference in the average rates between (A and D), (B and D), 
and (C and D).  These variables are known as dummy variables because mathematically they will 
be entered into the data set as either zero or one.  Note: these results use the more proper Poisson 
model: 
Output from Imaginary City: Fixed Effects Model 
Variable Coefficient Std.Err. b/St.Er. p value 
Constant 3.0620 0.0946 32.3850 0 
Month -0.0212 0.0107 -1.9830 0.0473 
RLC -0.4132 0.0975 -4.2390 2.24E-05 
A 0.8775 0.0848 10.3440 0 
B 0.8612 0.0913 9.4300 0 
C  0.0000 0.0945 0.0000 0.999 
Here we see what the data tell us: a small decreasing time trend, RLCs reduce accidents (from 
the -0.4132 coefficient on RLC), the accident rate at B is roughly the same as A, but both are 
                                                 
6 More technically, it would represent the difference between RLC intersections after RLC installation and all other 
intersections, including RLC intersections before RLCs were installed. 
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larger than C and D.  The coefficient on C (0.000) picks up the fact that C and D’s accident rates 
are equal (for a zero difference).  Intersection D does not have a coefficient estimate, because D 
is picked up in the “Constant” term.  The RLC variable has the proper sign and magnitude, 
because the “dummy” variables A, B, and C pick up any differences in accident rates between 
the intersections.  The fixed effects estimation told the same basic story as reported in Burkey & 
Obeng (2004): No reduction in angle accidents and a large increase in rear-end accidents. 
  
Retting and Kyrychenko’s Suggested RLCGROUP Methodology WILL NOT WORK 
(Except on made-up data) 
 
Let me again note that the Greensboro DOT did not place RLCs only at high accident locations, 
and many high accident locations did not receive RLCs.7  R&K suggest that the proper model 
would be to include a dummy variable for all intersections that were selected for a RLC 
placement, as a group.  This suggestion is improper because it assumes that all of these 
intersections are the same in terms of average accidents.  If you look at Table 4.1, you see that 
there is a great deal of variation in the accident rates among RLC sites.  Let me demonstrate the 
superiority of the Fixed Effects method over R&K’s “RLCGROUP” methodology. 
 
It makes no difference in R&K’s Imaginary City, because they create data in such a way that the 
RLC sites are identical.  Data analysis would be easy in such a world.  Suppose that next door to 
Imaginary City, Fakesborough also has four intersections and places RLCs at two of them, in 
exactly the same manner as Imaginary City.  However, in Fakesborough, Intersection A has a 
lower accident rate than Intersection B, but the RLC causes the same drop in the number of 
accidents.  Here, we take 20 accidents from the previous numbers for Intersection A and add 
them to Intersection B to introduce some “real-world” heterogeneity. 
Accidents in Fakesborough 
  Acc.   Acc.   Acc. Acc. 
Month Int. A Camera A Int. B Camera B Int. C Int. D 
1 30 N 68 N 20 22 
2 36 N 73 N 18 24 
3 26 N 64 N 19 21 
4 30 N 64 N 20 20 
5 23 N 67 N 19 17 
6 22 N 66 N 18 17 
7 24 N 50 Y 18 16 
8 23 N 49 Y 20 17 
9 8 Y 47 Y 17 20 
10 6 Y 47 Y 18 16 
11 8 Y 45 Y 19 15 
12 7 Y 46 Y 18 19 
A properly done Poisson model will estimate a coefficient that reflects the proportional decrease 
in accident rates caused by RLC placement.  These decreases are around 29% for Intersection B, 
                                                 
7 See for example Reese, Phillip. “Rate of Red-Light Crashes Steady,” The News and Record, March 3, 
2002, B1. 
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and around 73% for Intersection A.  Our estimate should reflect a proportion between these two.  
First, let’s run the RLCGROUP methodology that R&K suggest: 
R&K’s RLCGROUP Method: Fakesborough 
Variable Coefficient Std.Err. b/St.Er. p value 
Constant 3.22206 0.07912 40.726 0.00000 
MONTH -0.0475 0.01069 -4.443 0.00001 
RLC -0.06153 0.09393 -0.655 0.51200 
RLCGROUP 0.75047 0.06594 11.381 0.00000 
 
The coefficient on RLC is much too low at -0.06153, and is not statistically significant.  The 
Fixed Effects estimation: 
Fixed Effects Method: Fakesborough 
Variable Coefficient Std.Err. b/St.Er. p value 
Constant 3.0680 0.0955 32.1370 0.00000 
Month -0.0221 0.0109 -2.0240 0.04300  
RLC -0.3795 0.0961 -3.9490 0.00008 
A 0.1824 0.0961 1.8980 0.0577 
B 1.2790 0.0869 14.7130 0.00000 
C  0.0000 0.0945 0.0000 0.999 
 
Here the estimate is much more reasonable (-0.3795), predicting a much larger drop in accidents 
due to RLCs.  As previously mentioned, it is always possible to use a poor model with created 
data to get nonsensical results.  Fixed effects models are not poor models, but the RLCGROUP 
suggestion obviously is.  
 
R&K accuse our report of being “incompetent” “junk science”, yet they should understand 
that we properly accounted for intersection heterogeneity as described in the report.  They 
ought to know what a Fixed Effects model is, 8 and should be able to read in the study 
where we stated: 
“We ran fixed effects models dropping the intersection characteristics, since there was so 
little within site variation.  The overall results remained unchanged.”  (P. 55) 
 
Please believe that we went to extraordinary lengths to try many different techniques as 
appropriately as possible.  Every single technique we used gave the same indications about 
RLCs.  The Fixed Effects model version of the paper is now under peer review.9 
 
True, we did not use this method for presenting the results in the main body of the paper, because 
we found that the seventeen explanatory variables accounted for the differences between 
accident rates at intersections well enough, and we were also interested in examining those 
variables for the report. 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 I recommend Karlaftis and Tarko (1998) from Accident Analysis and Prevention as a good introduction and 
example if you are unfamiliar with these models. 
9 The fixed effects model was chosen for peer review because it is easier to describe and present results succinctly.  
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III. Flaw #2: Ignoring “Well-Known” Spillover Effects 
 
R&K often assert, rather than prove that spillover effects of RLCs on safety are well-
documented.  The very design of the Oxnard study makes a powerful assertion: That installing an 
RLC in a town will improve safety at all signalized intersections, but will not affect non-
signalized intersections.   This should not be a maintained assumption, but is a testable 
hypothesis.  This principle of “spillover effects” has not been adequately demonstrated with 
accident rates for red light cameras.  Indeed, as discussed in the next section, the overall safety 
effect of red light cameras at intersections with red light cameras has not been convincingly 
demonstrated.   
 
The IIHS regularly cites two studies with Retting as the lead author as evidence of a spillover 
effect on safety (Retting, Williams, Farmer and Feldman (1999(1)), Retting, Williams, Farmer 
and Feldman (1999(2)).  Together, these two studies describe examining a total of 5 intersections 
without red light cameras for an average of 24 hours each (both before and after).  They do not 
measure the effect on safety, but measure changes in the number of red light running violations 
at each intersection.  The extent to which the data on 5 intersections can be considered proof of a 
general concept should be considered limited.  In North Carolina all four legs of an intersection 
are clearly marked with large signs stating that a RLC is present.  It is not clear a priori that a 
spillover effect will exist in such a situation. 
 
We do not ignore spillover effects in the study.  However, if we do not measure a beneficial 
effect, why focus on measuring the spillover of these (non)effects?  In the raw data we observe 
that accident rates are decreasing much more at untreated intersections than at the RLC 
intersections.  In regional science and geography there is a principle called “Tobler’s Law”.  
Tobler’s Law simply states that everything is dependent on everything else, but the effect is 
stronger as things are closer.  Unless one believes that the spillover effects are stronger than the 
effect of an RLC at its location, the data do not support the idea of spillover effects.  However, 
we looked for a spillover effect of the RLCs on the overall accident trend in Greensboro, and 
found none.  Lastly, if there really are spillover effects, then the increases in rear-end accidents 
should spill over as well as any benefits, perhaps resulting in a “wash” depending on the relative 
frequencies of the two types of accidents. 
 
While data collection was in progress, we constructed a sophisticated model of spatial spillovers 
used in regional science and epidemiology, and geocoded the 303 intersections in our study for 
use with this model.  The model allows the effects of cameras to spread to nearby intersections, 
and allows the strength of the effect to decrease with distance.  I was somewhat surprised when 
we did not find any beneficial effects, because it made the idea of measuring the spillover of 
these effects moot.  See Anselin (1998) for more information on these models.  We are now 
investigating whether any useful results can be gleaned from this model. 
 
IV. The effects of RLCs are still uncertain 
 
R&K assert that our conclusions are obviously false because they contradict all other competent 
studies.  Many good reports estimate very different effects from RLCs.  How the program is 
implemented, what types of intersections are selected for RLCs, accompanying changes in 
 11
signage, and education campaigns will likely be important factors that determine the outcome of 
an RLC program.  In Greensboro (as in most places) the most common crashes at signalized 
intersections by far are angle accidents and rear-end accidents.  If the results in Persaud et al. 
(2004) are correct, then on average we should expect to find an average 23.3% decrease in angle 
accidents and a 17.5% increase in rear end accidents.10  Depending on the relative frequency of 
these accidents in a jurisdiction, the overall effects of the cameras at RLC sites could go either 
way.  At the 18 RLC intersections in Greensboro there were 63% more rear end accidents than 
angle accidents during the study—not the ideal type of intersection for RLC placement.   Note 
that in Persaud et al., one jurisdiction saw a small increase in angle accidents and an increase in 
rear end accidents, similar to our findings. 
 
In the evaluation of Red Light Cameras (RLCs), many comprehensive literature reviews (e.g. 
McFadden and McGee (1999), Maccubbin, Staples, and Salwin (2001), McGee and Eccles 
(2003), Milazzo, Hummer, and Prothe (2001), and Persaud et al.(2004) have concluded that poor 
data and poor statistical analyses in almost all studies on the safety impact of RLCs leave us 
unsure whether these devices improve safety or not.  It is simply impossible to look at all of the 
available data and be certain of the direction and magnitude of the effects.  Thus, the claim that 
our study is flawed because it contradicts previous studies is simply meaningless. 
 
The IIHS does its best to promote the studies of RLCs that support the efficacy of RLCs, and 
they have already spent a lot of effort denouncing our report and Andreassen(1995).  Another 
recent report is a Master’s Thesis from Nattaporn Yaungyai11 at Virginia Tech, supervised by 
Drs. Hobeika, Collura, and Trani (April 30, 2004).  It also finds no statistically significant 
reduction in crashes due to RLCs.  Although I have not had the opportunity to examine the 
methods used in this report, I am certain that like all studies it is not perfect, nor does it deliver 
the final answer.  I hope that the IIHS will refrain from issuing a report finding that Virginia 
Tech is full of incompetent scientists as well. 
 
V. Other Issues 
 
Let me quickly respond to a few additional issues and claims of R&K: 
 
On page 6 of the 2004 report on our work, R&K state that we provide misleading information on 
population growth rates that should have been used in their report.  I apologize if this is true.  
The Census Bureau’s data are not adequate for R&K, and they prefer “official California 
estimates” from the California Department of Finance.  However, they twist these numbers 
unjustly: “rates in Oxnard, Bakersfield, San Bernardino, and Santa Barbara between 1995 and 
1999 were 6.7, 12, 2.5, and 3 percent, respectively.  So compared with Oxnard, one city grew at 
a slightly faster pace while two grew at a slightly slower pace.” (R&K (2004))   (Emphasis not 
in original) 
  
                                                 
10 These percentages are a simple average of the results presented in Table 5, page 11, and may not accurately reflect 
a proper weighted average of their data. 
11 http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-06242004-230619/unrestricted/Thesis_3.pdf  
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When the estimate of accident reduction is 7%, the differences in these growth rates are not 
slight.  Twice and half as much cannot honestly be considered a slight difference.  Here is the 
data from the Census Bureau for the 1990-2000 censuses that we provided in the report: 
 
Population Growth in California Cities 
City 
1990 
Population 
2000 
Population 
% 
Change 
Bakersfield 174,820 247,057 41.32% 
San Bernardino 164,164 185,401 12.94% 
Santa Barbara 85,571 92,325 7.89% 
Oxnard 142,216 170,358 19.79% 
 
I prefer to use census data because it has historically been much more accurate than state 
estimates.12  With Bakersfield growing at more than 5 times the rate of Santa Barbara, and more 
than twice as fast as Oxnard, the failure to factor this into the controls will confuse an increase in 
accident rates with an increase in population.  If we make the simplistic assumption that the 
population grew linearly during the decade in each city, and calculate estimates of the population 
roughly in the middle of the before and after periods, we get the population figures in Table 4.  
Adjusting the data to accidents per 1,000 people we see accident rates falling in all cities but San 
Bernardino.   
 
Accidents Rates Adjusted for Population 
City  
Type of 
Intersection 
Pop Est. 
Before 
Pop. Est. 
After 
Rates per 1000 people % 
Change  Before After 
Bakersfield  Nonsignalized 209,628 229,220 3.63 3.29 -9.39% 
Bakersfield  Signalized 209,628 229,220 3.68 3.22 -12.34% 
San Bernardino  Nonsignalized 174,991 180,578 6.97 7.10 1.91% 
San Bernardino  Signalized 174,991 180,578 7.57 7.75 2.47% 
Santa Barbara  Nonsignalized 89,053 90,818 8.00 6.85 -14.34% 
Santa Barbara  Signalized 89,053 90,818 5.48 4.82 -11.99% 
Oxnard  Nonsignalized 156,356 163,822 6.36 6.17 -2.92% 
Oxnard  Signalized 156,356 163,822 8.46 7.63 -9.76% 
 
The accident rates at signalized intersections in Oxnard did not fall by quite as much as those in 
either Bakersfield or Santa Barbara.  Could this be due to the fact that Oxnard installed Red 
Light Cameras?  It is hard to interpret this data set as evidence of RLC safety improvement.     
 
From this highly aggregated data set and several strong possible confounding variables one 
cannot hope to find the true answer.  One should take note of the fact that the accident rate at the 
signalized intersections in Oxnard was the highest in the group.  A commonly found pattern in 
accident studies is that intersections or areas with extremely high accident rates in one time 
period will normally become lower naturally.  Termed the “regression to the mean effect”, this 
pattern should be considered when interpreting the results of any study of safety. 
  
                                                 
12 If one uses R&K’s preferred growth rates, the story remains much the same. 
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On page 6 of R&K (2004), they state that they cannot understand the confusion over their 
methods in the Oxnard study.  First, they do not accurately describe their model because they do 
not reveal that they dropped a variable.  Second, I contacted R&K several times asking them 
what they did.  They responded that they did not remember what they had done.  This response 
was very perplexing.  Kyrychenko then told me that they might have dropped one of the 
interaction terms.  In an attempt to verify their results, I dropped each of the interaction terms, 
and could not duplicate their results.13  Years later, they reveal in their critique of my study that 
they dropped the sig/nonsig variable (NOT an interaction term) because it wasn’t a good 
predictor.  Dropping a variable only because it lacks statistical significance is an improper 
technique, and it is improper not to disclose this in their “peer reviewed” study.  One should 
never drop a variable simply because it is not statistically significant.  Kennedy (1998, p. 94) 
states: 
Omission of a relevant independent variable: 
(a) In general, the OLS estimator for the coefficients of the remaining variables is 
biased.  […]  
(b) The variance-covariance matrix of estimated OLS coefficients becomes 
smaller (unless the omitted variable is orthogonal to the included variables, in 
which case it remains unchanged). […] 
(c) The estimator of the (now smaller) variance-covariance matrix of the OLS 
coefficients is biased upward, because the estimator of σ2 (the variance of the 
error term) is biased upward. This causes inferences regarding these parameters 
to be inaccurate.  This is the case even if the omitted variable is orthogonal to the 
others. 
    
Unless the authors believe that there is no fundamental difference between signalized and 
nonsignalized intersections, you must account for this in a model.  To drop a variable simply to 
increase the degrees of freedom and get statistical significance is statistically dishonest, and is 
not how one should model a data generating process.  Dropping variables for any reason other 
than “we know theoretically that they are irrelevant” causes the other coefficients in a well-
developed model to become biased, and inferences to be wrong.   
 
The fact that their model is not properly developed is another matter that is adequately discussed 
in Burkey and Obeng (2004).  They respond to these criticisms as well, but the last two 
responses in their document to our criticisms are self-contradictory.  They misuse the terms 
“control” and “statistical significance”.  They admit in one paragraph that the calculation of the 
estimate of crash reduction for RLCs is independent of the data on other cities (p. 6).  They then 
claim, “Therefore, the effect of the fine increase (if any) on crashes is captured by the 
comparison cities.” (p. 7)  Obviously, this is untrue.   
 
On average the accident rate in the 3 “control cities” fell by 7.3% at signalized intersections.  If 
this decrease was caused by the increase in the fine for red light running in California from $104 
to $270, an approximate 7.3% decrease in accidents should be seen in Oxnard as well at 
signalized intersections due to the fine increase, and this must be subtracted from the decrease 
that R&K claim is caused by RLCs.  We understand that they used the nonsignalized 
                                                 
13 I ran all 12 possible models, but must not have checked the one missing the sig/nonsig variable dropped closely 
enough.  I was in error, but would have appreciated accurate responses from the authors. 
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intersections as controls.  However, they never adjusted the estimate of crash reductions in any 
way for the effect of the fine increase.  Perhaps it is believed that the fine increase had no effect; 
if so, they should say so.  However, for some reason the accident rate per 1,000 people fell much 
more at signalized intersections in Bakersfield and Santa Barbara than in Oxnard.  Perhaps these 
larger decreases were related to the fine increase and/or RLC program, perhaps not.  Simply 
differencing the effect of signalized and nonsignalized intersections in Oxnard in no way 
corrects for this. 
 
VI. Final thoughts on the nature of science 
 
For many years parties have chosen sides over whether or not Red Light Cameras are “good” or 
“bad”.  They have done so not by looking carefully at the costs and benefits; rather, they do so 
because of preconceived notions of whether they should reduce accidents, or whether they are 
fair, or whether they bring revenue either to a municipality or a corporation.  The two factions 
have entered into a prolonged period of cognitive dissonance: 
 
Cognitive Dissonance: "Inconsistency among related beliefs . . .produces 
motivation to do whatever is easiest in order to regain cognitive consistency 
or consonance among beliefs."           Jones and Gerard(1967), p. 42. 
 
That is, those opposed to Red Light Cameras scramble to find data that support their beliefs, and 
demonize evidence to the contrary.  Similarly from the other side, the Insurance Institute for 
Highway Safety has demonized our recent work in the area, calling it “JUNK SCIENCE” 14, 
implying that we are incompetent, and making the claim that our findings are “so different from 
previous studies” solely because of this incompetence.  Retting and Kyrychenko have also issued 
a report where they “scientifically” show how ignorant we are.  In fact, several studies agree with 
our conclusions, and to dismiss them simply because they are not peer reviewed is illogical. 
 
If people in this arena cannot try to honestly look at data and make a reasonable decision, they 
should step aside.  Engaging in a battle over a preconceived opinion does not show evidence of 
understanding what science is.   Our study was very open and honest about the methods and data, 
and the limitations of these.  I encourage everyone to read the report that R&K criticize, and 
count how many times the limitations of the estimates are discussed, and caution the reader to 
not accept the study (or any study) blindly.  We implore the reader: 
 
While this study incorporated many advances in methodology over previous studies, 
additional work remains to be done. Because accident studies rarely use a true 
experimental design and data are not perfectly observable, additional careful study 
of RLCs is warranted to verify our results. (Executive Summary, Burkey and Obeng 
(2004)) 
 
Why do they label our work “Junk Science”?  Because the data gave us an answer that they didn’t 
like.  We did not create the answer—the data gave it to us.  We did not spend time trying to figure 
out a way to get a right or wrong answer.  We tried to discover the truth to the best of our abilities.  
We used many, many methods to analyze the data, and every one of them told the same story given 
                                                 
14 In Status Report Vol. 40, No. 1, January 3, 2005. 
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in our conclusion.  While “Junk Scientists” do shoddy work with shoddy data, twisting it to fit a 
particular position, hiding important details of the work, and overstating the true meaning of their 
results, we were very careful to give as honest an appraisal of our work as possible. 
 
In my research, I use Richard Feynman as my guide in how to approach the problem: 
 
"But I would like not to underestimate the value of the world view which is the result of 
scientific effort. The same thrill, the same awe and mystery, comes again and again when 
we look at any question deeply enough. With more knowledge comes a deeper, more 
wonderful mystery, luring one on to penetrate deeper still. Never concerned that the 
answers may prove disappointing, with pleasure and confidence we turn over each new 
stone to find unimagined strangeness leading on to more wonderful questions and 
mysteries - certainly a grand adventure."  Richard Feynman, 1965 Nobel Physicist  
  
A real scientist is never disappointed with the answer.  Honestly looking for the answer is the process 
of science.  Retting and Kyrychenko use contrived data and contrived, simplistic models to justify 
name-calling.  Had our report supported their position, they would have been likely to praise us as 
geniuses. 
 
I leave it to the reader to decide who the junk scientists are. 
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